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NOTE

Just Your Run-of-the-Mill
Sovereign Debt Crisis: An Analysis of
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.
JORDAN M. RETH†

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a
highly sensitive and controversial dispute between a group of
international investors and the country of Argentina. In Republic of
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,1 the Court considered whether the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) 2 limited the scope
of discovery available to a judgment creditor in post-judgment
execution proceedings against a foreign sovereign. 3 The majority
opinion found that while the FSIA grants jurisdictional and execution
immunity to foreign sovereigns, it contains no “plain statement” on
post-judgment discovery against a foreign sovereign. 4 Through this
textual silence, the majority held that the FSIA does not preclude
discovery of Argentina’s extraterritorial assets in post-judgment
proceedings.5
† J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School
of Law. The author thanks her family and friends for their support, Professor
Michael Van Alstine for his guidance, and the Maryland Journal of International
Law for their invaluable editorial work.
1. (Discovery Case), 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
2. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602−1611 (1976).
3. Discovery Case, 134 S.Ct. at 2253.
4. Id. at 225657.
5. Id.
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Although the majority rendered a judgment that supposedly
aligned with a strict textual interpretation of the FSIA, the opinion
focused squarely on the absence of an affirmative command in the
FSIA, while disregarding the broader purpose of the statute.
Importantly, the Court ignored the relevancy requirement of
discovery found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP),
thereby permitting transnational fishing expeditions. 6 The majority
opinion also casts aside considerations of international comity and
reciprocity in international relations. 7 The majority also fails to
acknowledge the distinct position of a sovereign state as a debtor.
Consequently, U.S. courts will be embroiled in complex transnational
discovery disputes and will be required to equitably balance interests
between the United States, other sovereign nations, and nonparties—
a task the Supreme Court has made much more difficult.
Part I of this Note describes the historical background to the
Argentine default and the procedural background of the NML Capital
case. Part II discusses the legal background of NML Capital by first
examining the history of sovereign immunity in the United States and
the enactment of the FSIA. Part II then analyzes U.S. discovery as it
is conducted domestically and the tensions it encounters abroad. Part
III addresses the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the NML Capital case
and its conclusion that the FSIA does not preclude discovery of
Argentina’s extraterritorial assets. Part IV argues that the majority in
NML Capital erred because it selectively interpreted the FSIA and
failed to recognize that requested discovery must be relevant, as
dictated by the FRCP. Furthermore, Part IV argues that the
majority’s disregard of international comity and reciprocity will hurt
the United States and its interests abroad, and that the Court’s
treatment of the Argentine default as a “run-of-the-mill” debt crisis is
a reductive error that will have far-reaching implications.
II. THE CASE
Petitioner, the Republic of Argentina, and respondent, NML
Capital, Ltd., have been embroiled in litigation battles regarding the
lack of bond repayment for over a decade. 8 While the courts have
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
7. See David E. Teitelbaum, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery,
38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 854 (1986) (noting that “[c]omity is a type of reciprocal
recognition of domestic laws between friendly countries”).
8. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina., 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012)
(discussing the Republic of Argentina’s default on payment of external debt
beginning in December 2001).
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been quick to note that Argentina has made many contributions to the
law of foreign insolvency, 9 the most recent default that set in motion
the litigation at issue began in December 2001, when Argentina
announced a moratorium10 on its debt service payments.11 This is
possibly the largest and most complex default in global history. 12
A. Background to the Argentine Default
Though Argentina’s economy was robust at the beginning of the
1900s, a century-long economic decline,13 and a sharp downturn in
the 1980s,14 led to the implementation of a convertibility system by
1991.15 This policy, which guaranteed a fixed exchange rate for
Argentine pesos to U.S. dollars, managed to stave off inflation and
encourage investors to seek out Argentina as a lucrative and stable
option for foreign investment.16 Indeed, Wall Street actively
marketed Argentina to its investors.17 Through the mid-to-late 1990s,
9. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007)
(noting that Argentina’s history of default and restructuring of sovereign debts has
produced a “rich literature” beginning with its London Stock Exchange bond
default in 1827).
10. See Alice de Jonge, What are the Principles on International Law
Applicable to the Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises?, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L.
129, 141 (2012) (discussing how debt moratoria can take the form of a complete or
partial cessation of payment for a permanent or limited period of time, and usually
are viewed as unilateral attempts by debtor states to bring about debt restructuring).
11. EM Ltd., 473 F.3d at 466.
12. Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors:
Implications of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 317 (2005).
13. See JIM SAXTON, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., ARGENTINA’S
ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES, 2, 6 (2003) (referencing the “economic
boom” in Argentina in the late 1800s; noting that, in 1913, Argentina’s GDP per
person was seventy-two percent of the U.S. level (higher than France, Germany, or
Sweden’s), but that by 1990, this economic measure was just twenty-nine percent
of the U.S. level—far below all Western European countries).
14. Id. at 1 (discussing the peso convertibility and exchange systems in which
many Latin and South American countries were engaging, as well as the
subsequent currency devaluations and economic crises).
15. Convertibilidad del Austral [Austral Convertibility], Law No. 23.928, Mar.
27, 1991, B.O 27104 (Arg.); Moneda de Curso Legal – Cambio de Denominación y
Valor de Billetes y Moneda [Legal Currency – Change of Designation and Value of
Banknotes and Currency], Decree No. 2128/91, Oct. 10, 1991, B.O. 27243 (Arg.).
See also Saxton, supra note 13, at 4.
16. SAXTON, supra note 13, at 4. See also Paul Blustein, Argentina Didn’t Fall
on Its Own, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A15438-2003Aug2.html.
17. Blustein, supra note 16 (describing the Goldman Sachs report, “A Bravo
New World” sent to clients in 1996, praising the country’s commitment to the peso
convertibility system which was seen to be particularly lucrative to investors, also
noting the habit of rating the performance of mutual and pension funds higher for
investing in emerging markets with large debt; Argentina was often No. 1 during
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Argentina’s economy expanded, with firms such as Goldman Sachs,
Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse First Boston building a presence
in Argentina, and facilitating the sale of bonds. 18 It is estimated that
securities firms made nearly $1 billion in fees underwriting Argentina
government bonds from 1991 to 2001.19
In addition to Argentina’s commitment to the convertibility
exchange system, the country’s swift and extensive deregulation
efforts made the country attractive to foreign investors.20 Bypassing
many of the normal and generally slower legislative channels,
President Carlos Menem enacted a number of deregulation reforms
by emergency decree.21 While this deregulation attracted investors
and helped modernize Argentina’s utilities, there was a growing
shadow of unemployment threatening economic stability. 22
Furthermore, there was increasing complacency among Argentine
government officials regarding spending in light of the “easy”
investment money coming in from foreign sources. 23
Impacted by currency crises in other countries that increased
interest rates and wreaked havoc on its economy, Argentina
experienced economic recessions in 1995 and 1998.24 Increased
political instability further harmed the Argentine economy. 25 As
the 1990s).
18. Id. See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 7 (finding that Argentina attracted
extensive foreign investment).
19. Blustein, supra note 16.
20. See id. (discussing the 1996 Goldman Sachs investment report that praised
President Carlos Menem’s deregulation reforms). See also, NAOMI KLEIN, THE
SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 30708 (2007) (discussing
the Goldman Sachs investment report entitled “A Bravo New World,” where
Argentina and other countries where praised for their massive privatization efforts).
21. See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that a possible reason for this
route was that Menem was facing opposition to reforms, even within his own
Peronist Party, due to a lack of transparency and the monopolistic character of
many of the reforms).
22. Id.
23. See Blustein, supra note 16 (quoting former Secretary of Economic Policy
for Argentina, Rogelio Frigerio, “[i]f you get the money so easily as we did, it’s
very tough to tell the politicians, ‘Don’t spend more, be more prudent,’ because the
money was there, and they knew it”).
24. Id. See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 8 (suggesting that the currency
crises in Russia and particularly Brazil, Argentina’s largest trading partner,
contributed to the 1998 recession).
25. See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 89 (noting that Fernando de la Rúa, who
succeeded President Menem in 1999, facing “widely differing ideas about
economic policy,” the resignation of de la Rúa’s Vice President, Carlos Alvarez, in
2000, and three resignations of three different economy ministers within three
weeks in 2001, further destabilized the Argentine government).
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Argentina became a less attractive investment opportunity, capital
began to leave the country. This led the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) to grant stand-by loans to Argentina in 2000 and 2001 that
totaled nearly $22 billion.26
The reality of massive bond payments coming due in 2001,
however, threatened to push the Argentine economy to the brink. 27 In
March 2001, Argentina entered into high interest refinancing deals,
or “debt swaps” of its bonds, which Wall Street banks suggested and
managed. 28 Despite forecasts for Argentina’s default, the seven firms
managing the refinancing deal pushed it through, making an
estimated $100 million in fees.29 The debt swap was only a shortterm solution, delaying the inevitable repayment, but now at higher
interest rates.30
Despite another installment of the IMF stand-by loans, by
November 2001, money was flying out of the country and Argentina
imposed extraordinary measures on withdrawals, essentially freezing
bank accounts.31 After rioting and another change in political regime,
Argentina defaulted on its debts at the end of 2001.32 Argentina’s
President declared a “temporary moratorium” on payments of a large
portion of its debt, including the bonds under the debt swaps. 33
In January 2005, Argentina presented a unilateral restructuring
offer to bondholders, which 76% of the parties accepted.34 In 2010,
another restructuring offer was presented to bondholders and nearly
all of them accepted the voluntary terms, except a small minority
26. See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that like other IMF loans, it
disbursed in installments, but unlike other IMF loans, it was the largest approved
for any country in history).
27. Blustein, supra note 16.
28. See id. (noting that David Mulford, chairman international of Credit Suisse
First Boston, met with Argentine economy minister Domingo Cavallo to propose a
“debt swap” where Argentina’s bondholders could voluntarily exchange old bonds
for new bonds, delaying the impending payments to a later time in an effort to give
Argentina “breaking space” to begin an economic recovery).
29. Id.
30. See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that while debt swaps
reduced debt repayments in the short term, they resulted in higher repayments
later).
31. Blustein, supra note 16.
32. Id.
33. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case I), 699
F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that as of 2012, Argentina has passed
legislation renewing the moratorium and has made no principal or interest
payments on its debts).
34. Porzecanski, supra note 12, at 317.
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including NML Capital. 35 In February 2012, the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York signed an order,36 affirmed by
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in October 2012,37 enjoining
Argentina from paying the restructured bondholders before the
holdout bondholders. 38 Negotiations between the holdouts and
Argentina were largely futile, 39 resulting in another default for
Argentina—this time affecting the payments to restructured
bondholders. 40
B. Background to the Case
NML Capital, a hedge fund, and other investors began to buy
Argentina’s distressed debt 41 through secondary markets as early as
1998 and as recently as June 2010.42 While the discount on distressed
debt can vary between 20% and 80%, 43 NML Capital’s purchase of
distressed Argentine debt has been described as “cents on the
dollar.”44 It is precisely this discount that makes distressed debt
35. See H.C., Argentina and the Holdouts: A Fight Without a Hero, THE
ECONOMIST (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:51 PM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/americas
view/2014/08/argentina-and-holdouts (noting that 93% of Argentina’s bondholders
opted to restructure).
36. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978 (TPG)
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) (granting injunctions to specifically enforce the pari
passu clause in Argentina’s debt documentation).
37. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 246.
38. See generally, Romain Zamour, NML v. Argentina and the Ratable
Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 55
(2013) (discussing the impact of the “ratable payment” interpretation on sovereign
debt restructuring and how it may be limited to the facts).
39. H.C., Argentina and the Holdouts Tick Tock, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 17,
2014, 10:17 AM) [hereinafter Tick Tock], http://www.economist.com/blogs/americ
asview/2014/07/argentina-and-holdouts.
40. Id.
41. See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An
Empirical Study of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 75
(2008) (describing distressed debt investing as purchasing the “debt of a financially
troubled company at a discount against the face value of the debt”). See also
Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds:
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L
253, 254 (2003) (noting that funds “specializing in distressed assets—also known
as ‘vulture funds’—are a new species of holdout creditor that has emerged . . .
[becoming] a creditor by way of the secondary market, purchasing sovereign debt
at a discount . . . [refusing] to participate in any voluntary restricting, [and]
attempt[ing] to use litigation to collect from the sovereign debtor the full face value
of its claim”; also noting that the term “vulture fund” is a pejorative”).
42. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 251.
43. See Harner, supra note 41, at 75.
44. Eighth Time Unlucky, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014)
http://www.economis t.com/news/leaders/21610263-cristina-fern-ndez-argues-hercountrys-latest-default-different-she-missing (noting the description of hedge funds
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attractive to investors. Despite the risks, distressed debt investors
will attempt to make a profit through restructuring deals, selling the
debt, or, similar to NML Capital’s strategy, by resorting to the courts
to recover the full value of the debt.45
NML Capital has filed eleven actions against Argentina in the
U.S District Court for the Southern District of New York.46 The
hedge fund has won five money judgments in its favor totaling (with
interest) nearly $1.6 billion. 47 In the remaining six actions, NML
Capital was granted summary judgments with claims totaling (with
interest) more than $900 million.48 Argentina, however, has refused
to satisfy these judgments, calling NML Capital “extortionists” and
decrying the U.S. court rulings as unjust.49 Argentina cites orders
enjoining the country from paying the restructured debt holders 50 and
a “Rights on Future Offers” (RUFO) 51 clause in the restructured bond
deals as reasons for not paying NML Capital.
In an effort to enforce the judgments, NML Capital has made
many attempts to gain discovery concerning Argentina’s assets in the
United States and around the world.52 One of the more notable
attempts was a 2012 Ghanaian Superior Court judgment,53 resulting
as “vulture funds” by Argentina and those opposed to this practice).
45. See Harner, supra note 41, at 75.
46. EM Ltd., v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012); see
also J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA’S DEFAULTED
SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEALING WITH THE “HOLDOUTS” 9 (2013) (noting that in the
United States, approximately 151 individual cases have been filed against
Argentina in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, with
108 judgments entered at $5.9 billion in principal and interest).
47. EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 203.
48. Id.
49. Sarah Marsh, Argentine Default Looms as Time Runs Out for Debt Deal,
REUTERS (Jul. 26, 2014, 8:51 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/usargentina-debt-idUSKBN0FV0DH20140726.
50. See supra Part I.A
51. See Tick Tock, supra note 39 (explaining that the RUFO clause written into
the restructured bond deals prevents Argentina from offering a better deal to other
entities than it is offering under the restructured deals, meaning if Argentina meets
NML Capital’s demands for payment in full, it must then pay the restructured debt
holders in full; noting that there is some disagreement over the exact impact of the
RUFO clause).
52. EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 203.
53. ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012,
available at
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.1
2.2012.corr.pdf; see also Régis Bismuth, The Path Towards an International
Public Policy for Sovereign Debt Contracts, 9 BRAZILIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 122, 123
(2014) available at http://www.regisbismuth.com/ (explaining that the litigation
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in the detention of an Argentine Navy vessel, with its crew still
aboard.54 Other high-profile incidents include attempts to seize the
Argentine presidential plane, Tango 01,55 a run-in at the Frankfurt
Book Fair,56 and Argentina’s withholding of certain pieces of artwork
from German exhibits, out of concern that they would be seized. 57
In 2010, NML Capital served subpoenas on Bank of America
and Banco de la Nación Argentina, two non-party financial
institutions. 58 This was done in an attempt to gain discovery
regarding how Argentina moved assets through New York and
around the world, so as to “accurately identify the places and times
when those assets might be subject to attachment and execution”
whether in the U.S. or in foreign jurisdictions.59
Both subpoenas defined “Argentina” broadly to include the
country’s “agencies, ministries, instrumentalities, political
subdivisions [and] employees,” with the Bank of America subpoena
including Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.60
Furthermore, the Bank of America subpoena sought documents
without a territorial limit.61
In post-judgment proceedings, Argentina and both non-party
banks moved to quash the subpoena, while NML Capital moved to

reached the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, which finally ordered the
release of the vessel).
54. Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a
Vessel in Ghana and Even Went for Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’, FORBES (Oct. 5,
2012, 6:50 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-realstory-behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seizethe-presidential-plane/.
55. Id.
56. Id. (noting that Argentina registered at the Frankfurt Book Fair as an
individual person, rather than as a sovereign, perhaps in a bid to avoid exposure,
and specifically held back pieces of artwork for fear of seizures).
57. Id.
58. EM Ltd., 695 F. 3d at 20304.
59. Id.
60. EM Ltd., v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2012); Joint
Appendix at 39, 77, 92, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct.
2250 (2014) (No. 12-842), 2014 WL 769626, at *47, *57, *84.
61. EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 204. See Joint Appendix at 39, Republic of Argentina
v. NML Capital, Ltd. (Discovery Case), 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (no. 12-842), 2014
WL 769626, at *50 (requiring specified document production for all “databases and
transactional systems to which [Bank of America has] possession, custody, or
control that would contain the records sought for [Argentina],” not specifying
territorial limitations as Bank of America is a multinational financial institution
with locations globally).
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compel. 62 Ultimately, the district court compelled discovery, but
expected the parties to “limit the subpoenas to discovery that was
reasonably calculated to lead to attachable property.”63 Argentina
appealed the order to the Second Circuit, arguing that compelling
discovery against its foreign assets abroad violates the FSIA. 64 The
Second Circuit affirmed the discovery order, noting that the
subpoenas did not attach Argentine property and were not directed to
Argentina itself—but rather at third party banks—and did not
infringe Argentina’s sovereign immunity. 65 Argentina appealed the
Second Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court.66
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Background of Sovereign Immunity in the United States and
the Enactment of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act
1. Sovereign Immunity and the Shift Toward a Restrictive
Theory of Immunity
Sovereign immunity law derives from the maxim that the “King
can do no wrong.”67 Initially, the United States adhered to a doctrine
of “absolute immunity,” meaning sovereign states were always
immune from prosecution in U.S. courts.68 This was first considered
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,69 where the Supreme Court
held that a military ship of a foreign sovereign that maintains a
62. EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 204 (noting that before the District Court rules, NML
Capital agreed to some limitations to the breadth of the subpoenas and certain
confidentiality measures).
63. Id. at 20405.
64. Id. at 205.
65. Id.
66. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014).
67. Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349, 353
(1925) (discussing the tradition of English monarchy but noting that before Edward
I [12391307] there was the “fable” of a king sued in court like an ordinary person,
and noting that Saxon kings were elected to the throne, rather than assuming it
through a “divine right” principle).
68. Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (holding that
ships owned by foreign powers are immune from U.S. court jurisdiction, regardless
of the nature of the ship’s conduct, essentially endorsing the theory of absolute
sovereign immunity). See also Stephen J. Leacock, The Joy of Access to the Zone
of Inhibition: Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., and the Commercial Activity
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 81, 85 (1996) (discussing the U.S. endorsement of the classical, or
absolute, theory of sovereign immunity).
69. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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peaceful relationship with the United States, “must be considered as
having come into the American territory, under an implied promise,
that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly
manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.”70
The premise underlying the absolute immunity doctrine was that
sovereigns were equals and one could not exercise dominion over the
other.71
In 1952, the U.S. State Department joined a growing
international trend and embraced a “restrictive theory” of sovereign
immunity. 72 This meant, “immunity of the sovereign is recognized
with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of state, but not
with respect to private acts (jure gestoinis).”73 Essentially, the
restrictive theory narrowed sovereign immunity to only the public
acts conducted by the sovereign on behalf of the state.74 While courts
were not bound by the State Department’s shift in policy, the influx
of amici briefs filed by the Executive branch in cases involving
foreign sovereigns frequently persuaded the courts to follow the
restrictive theory. 75
2. The Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
While the U.S. State Department adopted a restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, it failed to outline any clear standard for
implementation, and political pressure often led to inconsistent State
Department intervention in cases. 76 By enacting the FSIA, Congress
70. Id. at 147.
71. Texas Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
302 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981) overruled by Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State
Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting the ancient
maxim of sovereign immunity – par in parem imperium non habet).
72. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL.,
Jun. 1952, at 984 [hereinafter “Tate Letter”] (noting the trend of restricting
sovereign immunity in Western Europe, as well as other areas of the world). See
also The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to
the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, signed at Brussels, April 10 1926, English
text, available at 6 BENEDICT, Admiralty 23942 (7th ed. Knauth, 1958). The
treaty was signed by ten countries that originally supported the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity.
73. Tate Letter, supra note 72, at 984.
74. Id.
75. See Leacock, supra note 68, at 8687 (noting that the State Department
amicus briefs often persuaded the courts).
76. See Verlingen B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983)
(discussing how application of the newer, restrictive sovereign immunity theory
“proved troublesome” as “foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the
State Department in seeking immunity”).
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codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in U.S. law and
thereby reduced the role of the State Department in corresponding
litigation.77 As the House Report noted:
[A] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the
determination of sovereign immunity from the
executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby
reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity
determinations and assuring litigants that these often
crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process.78
The FSIA is now the only means of establishing jurisdiction
over a foreign state in a U.S. court.79 A U.S. court can assert
jurisdiction over a sovereign when a foreign state’s actions fall within
one of the enumerated exceptions, including commercial activities. 80
However, how Congress intended to define the terms “foreign state”
and “commercial activities” has been a frequent source of confusion.
Under the FSIA, a foreign state is defined to include the
“political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state.”81 In determining agency and/or
instrumentality, courts have historically relied on the “majority
ownership” analysis, 82 but the Supreme Court narrowed this approach
77. Leacock, supra note 68, at 8788.
78. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 660608; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct 2240, 225253
(2004) (holding that the FSIA applies retroactively to conduct that occurred before
its enactment).
79. See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 443 (1989) (noting that the FSIA “provides the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over a foreign state” in the U.S. courts).
80. 28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2008). “A foreign state shall not be immune from
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States . . . .”
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2005). The section states, “[a]n ‘agency or
instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity, which is a separate legal
person, corporate or otherwise, and which is an organ of a foreign state or political
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. . . .”
82. See Matthew Engellenner, The Disadvantaged Plaintiff: Is it Time to
Revisit the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP.
ADVOC. 375, 383 (2012) (discussing the “majority ownership test” in regard to
evaluating a foreign state’s ownership interest in an entity).
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in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson 83 by holding that the majority
ownership must be “direct” to meet the FSIA definition of agency or
instrumentality. 84
Additionally, questions of what constitutes the “commercial
activities” exception have plagued the courts.85 When the U.S.
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Republic of Argentina v.
Weltover, 86 it adopted the Second Circuit’s “private person test,”87
declaring that if a sovereign performs an act that could readily be
performed by a private citizen, then those actions are “commercial”
within the meaning of the FSIA and the sovereign cannot invoke
immunity. 88 Again, this is reflective of the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity that was meant to be codified within the FSIA.
All of the exceptions and nuances of the definitions aside, there
is a presumption of immunity for foreign states in U.S. courts under
the FSIA. 89 The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA confers two
types of immunity upon foreign states: jurisdictional immunity under
section 1604 and execution immunity under sections 1609 and
1610.90

83. 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
84. Id. at 474. The court defined “direct” in terms of corporate law, citing the
majority ownership of shares, as opposed to ownership through corporate tiers. Id.
at 47475. The court reasoned that the FSIA refers explicitly to the “ownership of
‘shares,’ showing that Congress intended statutory coverage to turn on formal
corporate ownership.” Id. at 474.
85. Compare Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, (454 U.S. 1148 (1982)) (reasoning
that an activity is commercial “if the activity is one in which a private person could
engage), with Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1548
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reasoning that analysis of the “basic exchange” and not on the
“facilitating features” is determinative as to whether an activity is commercial
under the FSIA), and with De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d
1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985) (basing its decision upon “the different purposes
motivating the sales,” reasoning that “the essence of an act is defined by its
purpose”).
86. 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
87. See Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 300.
88. Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2008). See Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria., 328
F.3d 1267, 1271 (2003) (noting that a foreign state is presumptively immune under
the FSIA and remains so unless one of the specific statutory exceptions applies).
90. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252.
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B. United States Discovery – at Home and Abroad
1. The United States Adversary System and its Impact on
Domestic Discovery
As a common law country, the United States employs an
adversarial legal system, meaning that many of the pre-trial and trial
decisions, like discovery, are left to the parties and their counsel. 91
This contrasts with civil law countries, which typically employ
inquisitorial pre-trial and trial procedures that leave the process
principally in the hands of a judge.92 Within an adversarial system,
the opposing parties will generally need to conduct discovery so that
a trial will be “less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible
extent.”93 U.S. discovery has been described as “wide-open” when
compared globally, 94 likely due in large part to the country’s rigorous
adversarial system. 95
However, the relevancy requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) is a
significant limit on the scope of discovery, mandating that “[u]nless
otherwise limited by court order . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense . . . [and r]elevant information need not be
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 96
In addition to the FRCP, the inherent supervisory powers of the
91. See Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and The Adversary System, 40 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 653, 653 (2007) (noting that the central precept of the adversarial
system is the clash of proofs presented by opposing lawyers so a neutral and
passive decision maker can evaluate the information presented and resolve the
dispute).
92. Id. at 653.
93. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (finding
that in the case at issue, the desired disclosure of grand jury materials to the
defendant in a civil case did not outweigh the public policy interest in grand jury
secrecy).
94. See Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254 (noting that the general rule in the
federal system as stated in FRCP 26(b)(1) is that, subject to the district court’s
discretion, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”). See also David Brewer, Obtaining
Discovery Abroad: The Utility of the Comity Analysis in Determining Whether to
Order Production of Documents Protected by Foreign Blocking Statutes, 22 HOUS.
J. INT’L L. 525, 536 (2000) (describing the U.S. approach to discovery like the
freedom of speech, premised on a “wide-open” approach to find the truth).
95. See Asimow, supra note 91, at 653 n.1 (noting that the U.S. employs a
more extreme version of the adversarial system than any other country).
96. FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1).
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courts are another important source of discovery law in the United
States.97 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States also provides authoritative, albeit non-binding,
guidance in regard to U.S. discovery abroad.98
In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, the specific type of
discovery at issue was that utilized in post-judgment execution
proceedings, which are governed by FRCP 69(a)(2).99 That rule
permits a judgment creditor to obtain discovery from “any person—
which includes a judgment debtor—as provided in [the FRCPs] or by
the procedure of the state where the court is located.”100 Both federal
and New York state rules governing post-judgment execution
discovery are generally permissive.101 As with other forms of
discovery, a judgment creditor who is seeking discovery in aid of
execution “must proceed in good faith, and must not use disclosure
devices for harassment, especially when dealing with a nonparty.” 102
Nonparties are not immune from discovery orders. FRCP 37(c)
provides that nonparties “may be compelled to produce documents
and tangible things or to permit an inspection.” 103 Because a
subpoena duces tecum is available under FRCP 45 to gain document
disclosure without the need for depositions, it is typically used on
nonparties, 104 and is intended to be “as broad against a nonparty as
against a party.”105
97. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P 26(c) (providing for court-imposed sanctions
against parties who use discovery devices excessively without justification or who
fail to comply with discovery requests). See also Amy Coney Barrett, The
Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 33435 (2006)
(noting that “because a federal court could not exercise its core Article III power of
adjudication without an accurate and relevant factual record, it must have the power
to do those things necessary to develop an accurate and relevant factual record–
including such things as managing discovery, compelling testimony, appointing
experts, and excluding and admitting evidence.”).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 442 (1987). See infra Part II.B.3.
99. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254.
100. FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2).
101. Id. See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW ANN. § 5223 (West 1997) (entitles judgment
creditors to discover “all matter relevant to the satisfaction of [a] judgment.”). See
also Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254 (commenting on the permissive nature of
the FRCP and New York Law regarding discovery).
102. 30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 623 (2005).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c).
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 45.
105. Id. See also FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (allowing a nonresident to be
designated by the institutional deponent, thereby overcoming the “100 mile”
geographic limitation of FRCP 45); Jay C. Carlisle, Nonparty Document Discovery
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Federal courts have differed regarding what an opposing party
must show when seeking post-judgment discovery in aid of
execution. The Ninth Circuit has stated that if a party seeking
discovery can illustrate “significant questions regarding
noncompliance,” then appropriate discovery should be granted.106
The Sixth Circuit has stated that, in seeking post-judgment discovery
arising from a fraud on the court claim, “it [is] at least necessary” for
the defendant requesting the discovery to present some proof to
establish its charges of fraud.107
Of particular interest to this paper, the Third Circuit considered
the impact of NML Capital in Ohntrup v. Makin Ve Kimya Endustrisi
Kurumu,108 finding that if a subject property is immune under the
FSIA from attachment, “then the District Court should deny . . . [the]
discovery request ‘because information that could not possibly lead
to executable assets is simply ‘not relevant’ to execution in the first
place.’”109 However, the court noted that if the district court found
the subject property was not immune, then that factor would weigh in
favor of the party seeking discovery, and if the district court chooses
not to decide the subject property’s immunity or lacks “sufficient
information” to decide, then “any speculation in that regard should
not be a factor in the [c]ourt’s unreasonable burden analysis” in
deciding to grant discovery. 110
2. The Tensions of United States Discovery in Foreign
Jurisdictions
District courts are empowered to grant a motion to compel
discovery in foreign jurisdictions. Under U.S. law, courts have been
able to impose jurisdiction in foreign nations through the doctrine of
extraterritoriality. 111 Courts consider several factors when determining
from Corporations and Governmental Entities Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 37 (1987).
106. California Dept. of Social Services v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025, 1034 (2008)
(finding that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) analysis that summary judgment should not be
granted while an opposing party timely seeks discovery of potentially favorable
information also applies to the analysis of permitting discovery in the context of a
motion to enforce a judgment).
107. H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1122 (6th
Cir. 1976).
108. 760 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2014).
109. Id. at 29697 (quoting Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2257).
110. Id. at 297 (analyzing Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 225758).
111. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1310 (1985) [hereinafter
Predictability and Comity] (discussing the need to develop a set of principles to
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if the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a person or activity
is unreasonable.112 While there is a general presumption against
extraterritoriality, the rise of the global economy and increased legal
transactions in areas such as trademark, antitrust, and taxation have
helped spur the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 113 This
extended reach has strained foreign relations over what is often
perceived as an aggressive and inconsistent imposition of U.S.
jurisdiction and has led many foreign states to enact retaliatory
legislation. 114
One type of retaliatory legislation used by foreign states are
blocking statutes. These laws are designed to block U.S. discovery in
foreign jurisdictions by imposing criminal penalties upon parties who
disclose evidence. 115 However, even if a party faces criminal
penalties in a foreign jurisdiction for compliance with a U.S. court
order, that alone may not be sufficient to deny discovery. 116
The seminal case analyzing motions to compel discovery in the
face of foreign blocking statutes and the consideration of sanctions
for the failure to comply is Societe Internationale Pour
Participations Industrialles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers.117 In
Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court addressed whether a case
could be dismissed based on the petitioner’s failure to comply with a
evaluate alternatives to the general doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES (REVISED) § 403(2) (1987). These factors include the activity’s connection
to the territory (e.g. substantial or direct contact), the state seeking jurisdiction’s
connection to the person of which jurisdiction is desired (e.g. nationality), the
character of the activity to be regulated, the existence of justified expectations that
might be protected or hurt, the importance of the regulation to the international
political, legal, or economic system, the regulation’s consistency with traditions of
the international system, the interest of the regulating state, and the likelihood of
conflicts with another state’s regulations.
113. Mark Gibney, Response, Toward a Theory of Extraterritoriality, MINN. L.
REV. HEADNOTES, Spring 2011, at 81, 82 nn.4–6,
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes/theory-extraterritoriality/.
114. See Predictability and Comity, supra note 111, at 131011 n.6 (1985)
(noting that retaliatory legislation falls into three main categories: secrecy statutes,
blocking statutes, and “clawback” statutes).
115. See Brewer, supra note 94, at 526, 536 (noting that comity is complicated
by the “great antipathy some foreign jurisdictions have for American style
discovery”).
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (allowing a court to impose sanctions upon a party
for its failure to comply with a court discovery order). While FRCP 37 does not
explicitly list default judgments as a possible sanction, they have been “sustained as
a valid exercise of the District Court’s power under FRCP 37(d).” In re Uranium
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980).
117. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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U.S. court order for document production concerning a Swiss Bank
account, when doing so would potentially violate Swiss law. 118 The
Court held that the district court was justified in issuing a production
order, despite the petitioner’s risk of criminal penalties in
Switzerland.119
In deciding to uphold the production order, the Court analyzed
three factors.120 The Court first reasoned that a decision to broadly
deny discovery in all cases where a party feared criminal penalties
from a foreign jurisdiction would run counter to Congress’ intent in
enacting the statute at issue. 121 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
particular records at issue might have a “vital influence” in the
litigation.122 Finally, the Court pointed out that the petitioner is in a
position to negotiate a waiver of the criminal penalty with the foreign
nation, or “at least achieve a significant measure of compliance with
the production order.”123 While these three factors helped frame the
decision, the Court strictly limited the analysis to the instant case,
thereby also limiting its precedential value.124
3. A Shifting Landscape – From a Pure Comity Approach to
Balancing Tests
In choosing to limit the holding in Societe Internationale, the
Supreme Court failed to provide a clear framework for analysis in the
lower courts, leading to inconsistent evaluations of non-compliance
with U.S. discovery in foreign jurisdictions. 125 Initially, courts
118. Id. Specifically, Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, prohibiting economic
espionage, and Article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law, concerning secrecy of banking
records. Id. at 200.
119. Id. at 205–06.
120. Id. at 204 (noting that although Swiss penal laws “did limit [the]
petitioner’s ability to satisfy the production order,” that they did not do so to the
level where the documents effectively “disappeared” or were taken into custody by
a third party). See also Brewer, supra note 94, at 537 (discussing the Court’s use of
three factors, which have become the backbone for analyzing the suitability of
production orders for foreign evidence).
121. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 20506 (noting that in broadening the
Trading with the Enemy Act in 1941, Congress intended to reach “enemy interests
which masqueraded under . . . innocent fronts,” therefore, if discovery was denied
in all cases where a party faced criminal penalties in a foreign jurisdiction, parties
would be incentivized to seek out those jurisdictions to avoid discovery). Brewer,
supra note 94, at 537.
122. Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 205.
123. Id.
124. Brewer, supra note 94, at 538.
125. GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 873 (3d ed. 1996); Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 844.
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emphasized foreign relations in deciding whether to compel U.S.
discovery abroad when faced with a foreign blocking statute. The
Second Circuit, noting that foreign law prohibitions on disclosure act
as a bar to ordering production of documents,126 developed what came
to be known as the “pure comity” approach.127
Critics of the pure comity evaluation pointed out that the
approach favored foreign law over U.S. substantive law, thereby
encouraging the enactment of foreign blocking statutes and the
creation of “information havens” to frustrate U.S. court orders.128
They also argued that the pure comity approach would deny basic
justice to parties seeking discovery. 129
Eventually, the lower courts shifted from a pure comity
approach to a number of balancing tests that varied between partial
deference to foreign blocking statutes laws and total disregard for
international relations. 130 These balancing tests analyzed factors
largely based on Societe Internationale, the five-factor analysis in
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations of United States,131 or

126. See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting
that while the U.S. government has a real interest in obtaining evidence wherever it
is located, the government also has an obligation to respect laws of other sovereign
states); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960) (reasoning that under
“fundamental principles of international comity, [the] courts dedicated to the
enforcement of . . . laws should not take such action as may cause a violation of the
laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its
procedures.”); First Nat’l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959)
(noting that if production of documents in Panama would violate Panamanian laws,
then discovery should not be ordered).
127. See Daniela Levarda, Note, A Comparative Study of U.S. and British
Approaches to Discovery Conflicts: Achieving a Uniform System of Extraterritorial
Discovery, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1340, 136466 (1995) (noting that this
approach centered on “maintaining amicable relations with non-U.S. trading
partners” by deferring to foreign blocking statutes when determining whether to
compel U.S. discovery abroad).
128. Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 865. Teitelbaum defines an “information
haven” as “a jurisdiction whose laws are intentionally structured to attract
commerce based on a promise of secrecy.” Id. at 848 n. 32.
129. Id. at 856.
130. Brewer, supra note 94, at 544.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 40 (1965) (listing the five-factor analysis: (a) vital national interests of
each of the states; (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) the extent to which the
required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; (d) the
nationality of the person; and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by that state).
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a combination thereof. 132 Without a definitive standard, however, the
factors were applied piecemeal—with some courts adding factors or
emphasizing some over others in their analyses. 133 Not surprisingly,
the lack of consensus among the lower courts led to inconsistent
holdings. 134
Partially to blame for the piecemeal application of the various
factors was that the Restatement (Second) was drafted for general
issues of international conflict, not specifically tailored for noncompliance issues regarding U.S. discovery abroad.135 In an attempt
to reconcile this, the tentative drafts and final texts of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States created
provisions to include non-compliance with discovery in a foreign
jurisdiction.136 While the Supreme Court in Societe Nationale
132. Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 856.
133. See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981)
(adopting a balancing test that strictly adhered to the five-factors from Section 40
of the Restatement Second); Minpeco v. S.A. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116
F.R.D. 517, 522–23 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1987) (modifying the Restatement Second
factors and creating a new four-part balancing test); In re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (emphasizing the importance
of U.S. statutory policies, the importance of the requested documents to key
elements of the claims, and the degree of flexibility in the foreign nation’s
application of its nondisclosure laws). See also Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at
85758 (noting that a piecemeal application of the Restatement factors was due in
part to the general conflicts provision of section 40).
134. See Brewer, supra note 94, at 544 (discussing the lack of consensus among
the courts in regard to the various balancing tests). Compare United States v.
Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming civil contempt orders
for a failure to comply with production orders, and noting that Societe “held only
that the district court could not dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply
with a discovery request where the plaintiff had made extensive good faith efforts
to comply”) with In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563
F.2d 992, 99799 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a lack of good faith on the part of
the non-compliant party is not determinative in compelling a production order, and
noting that the defense did not “stand or fall” on the discovery order).
135. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512 (N.D. Ill. April, 13,
1984) (noting that § 40 of the Restatement “addresses international conflicts in
general, and is not tailored precisely to conflicts between discovery procedures and
blocking statutes”).
136. Id. at § 442(1)(c) (listing the revised five-factor analysis:”[i]n deciding
whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in
framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into
account [a] the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested [b] the degree of specificity of the request; [c] whether
the information originated in the United States; [d] the availability of alternative
means of securing the information; and [e] the extent to which noncompliance with
the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where
the information is located”).
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Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,137 suggested
that the Restatement (Third) factors are “perfectly appropriate for
courts to use” when there is no treaty to govern discovery requests,
the Court did not require their use.138 This has again led to divergent
interpretations among the lower courts.139
4. International Law Conflicts with U.S. Discovery Practice
While international law has attempted to provide a legal
framework for transnational discovery, the results have not been
harmonious. International treaties, bilateral treaties, and mutual
assistance agreements140 have been drafted and signed in an effort to
create a more consistent and predictable transnational discovery
process, but to varying results.
The United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague
Evidence Convention),141 a multilateral treaty designed to create a
measure of predictability and stability in transnational discovery
proceedings.142 A primary concern during the drafting of the treaty
was that the taking of evidence on foreign soil could be inconsistent
with the laws of the country where the litigation takes place, creating

137. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
138. Id. at 556. See also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Aérospatiale’s departure
from first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention for a comity analysis).
139. See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court has
identified these factors as relevant in the analysis, but then stating two additional
factors to consider: whether “any hardship to the responding party would suffer if it
complied with the discovery demands and whether the responding party has
proceeded in good faith”).
140. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) are instruments that assist in
taking evidence in a country for criminal matters and will not be further discussed
in this Note. See Mark K. Gyandoh, Foreign Evidence Gathering: What Obstacles
Stand in the Way of Justice?, TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J., Spring 2001 at 81, 89
(2001) (discussing the appearance of MLATs in the mid-twentieth century in order
to compel countries to assist each other, including in criminal evidentiary matters).
141. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague
Evidence Convention] (consisting of a multilateral treaty, of which the United
States became a signatory in 1972). See also George A. L. Droz, A Comment on the
Role of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 3, 34 (1994) (discussing the first Hague Convention on Civil Procedure,
which was revised in 1905 and ratified in 1954, but by 1965 was broken into three
“modern” conventions for Service, Evidence, and a final convention combining
legal aid, deposits for costs, safe conduct of witnesses, and detention of foreign
debtors).
142. Brewer, supra note 94, at 531.
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conflict and leading to ineffective results for litigants.143 Therefore,
the Hague Evidence Convention provides that local judicial or
government officials be included in most evidence gathering
functions allowed under the treaty’s terms. 144 While this seems to be
workable in theory, the Hague Evidence Convention has become a
source of litigation within the United States regarding its
interpretation and impact upon U.S courts’ ability to compel
transnational discovery. 145
The language in the Hague Evidence Convention itself creates a
number of tensions that run counter to the consistent and harmonious
framework it was intended to create. First, the treaty incorporates a
number of provisions allowing signatories to opt out of certain
procedures.146 Furthermore, the treaty does not address judicial
supervision and the amount of supervision required to appropriately
execute an extraterritorial discovery request, thereby doing nothing to
reconcile the difference in discovery proceedings between civil and
common law jurisdictions. 147
Moreover, the Hague Evidence
Convention does not advance a specific relevancy standard, again
creating a rift among countries and fragmentation in application of
the treaty. 148
Apart from standards absent from the treaty, U.S courts diverged
on how to interpret the Hague Evidence Convention, especially
before the determinative case, Aérospatiale.149 At least one district
143. Id.
144. Id. See also Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 142, at arts. I, II,
VIII, and IX.
145. See Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections
on its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 79 (1994)
(explaining that the Hague Evidence Convention has been frequently litigated in
the United States, primarily regarding its “exclusivity” or when (if at all) the
treaty’s discovery procedures must be used in place of U.S. discovery
mechanisms).
146. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 142, at arts. IX, XII, XXIII,
XXXIII. Article IX mandates that a state executing a letter of request shall apply
its own laws regarding procedure; article XII permits a signatory to refuse letters of
request under certain conditions; article XXIII permits signatories to opt out of
certain pre-trial discovery obligations; article XXXIII permits signatories to opt out
of obligations regarding the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular
agents, and commissioners.
147. Levarda, supra note 127, at 1349.
148. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26) (noting that while some signatories have left
relevancy determinations to judges based on the substantive issues in particular
cases, the United States has found relevancy to be satisfied “as long as it is
reasonably calculated to result in the procurement of admissible evidence”).
149. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court
(Aérospatiale), 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
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court disagreed with a plaintiff’s argument that the Hague Evidence
Convention was “intended merely to supplement the less restrictive
means provided by the [FRCP],” suggesting it may be the exclusive
means of obtaining discovery within a foreign signatory nation.150
The Court of Appeals of Texas held in another case that the Hague
Evidence Convention procedures must be complied with as an
“avenue of first resort.”151 The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, held that the
Hague Evidence Convention contains no express provisions for
exclusivity and that it does not supplant the FRCP discovery
provisions when production of evidence involves individuals subject
to in personam jurisdiction of a U.S. court.152
In Aérospatiale, the Supreme Court held that the Hague
Evidence Convention was not the exclusive means of obtaining
discovery within a foreign jurisdiction. 153 The Court noted that, while
“judicial supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its
costs and inconvenience,” it is sometimes necessary to seek
transnational discovery. 154 Therefore, “the district court must
supervise pretrial proceedings” to prevent abuse of discovery
devices.155 In deciding this, however, the Court did not sweep
consideration of international relations aside, stating:
[W]e have long recognized the demands of comity in
suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as
sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation.
American courts should therefore take care to
demonstrate due respect for any special problem
confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its
nationality or the location of its operations, and for

150. Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60
(E.D. Penn. 1983) (noting that permitting “one sovereign to foist its legal
procedures upon another whose internal rules are dissimilar would run afoul of the
interests of sound international relations and comity”). See also Brewer, supra note
94, at 533.
151. Sandsend Financial Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex.
App. 1988) (quoting Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.
1984)) (declining to hold that the Hague Evidence Convention’s procedures are
mandatory).
152. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding
that a German corporation, subject to court jurisdiction under Louisiana long-arm
statute, was subject to federal discovery rules).
153. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544.
154. Id. at 546.
155. Id.
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any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.156
Significantly, but unhelpfully, the Court declined to articulate
specific standards or factors to guide this most “delicate task” of
balancing U.S. and foreign interests. 157 This left transnational
discovery not only still in disarray, but also with new U.S precedent
that chipped away at any harmonizing efforts the Hague Evidence
Convention was able to accomplish.
However, the Hague Conference yielded another treaty relating
to transnational discovery: the Convention on the Service Abroad of
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters
(Hague Service Convention),158 which attempted to streamline the
process for service of transnational parties through a number of
mechanisms, including requiring signatories to create central
authorities for the delivery of service.159
As with the Hague Evidence Convention, the Hague Service
Convention also created confusion, particularly in the United States
regarding whether the Convention permitted service upon a foreign
corporation through its wholly-owned and closely-controlled U.S.
subsidiary as an involuntary agent.160 The Supreme Court in
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,161 held that the Hague
Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a
foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under
state law, is the foreign corporation’s involuntary agent for service. 162
The Schlunk decision thereby not only depleted the Convention’s
effectiveness, but also created further uncertainty in the process of
156. Id. at 546.
157. Id.
158. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague
Service Convention] (consisting of a multilateral treaty – to which the United States
is a signatory, which entered into force Feb. 10, 1969 – that attempted to provide a
simpler way to serve process abroad, while assuring fair notice and proof of
service).
159. See Elizabeth L. Cocanougher, The Hague Service Convention as Enabler:
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
175, 176 (1988) (discussing the central authority for delivery of service under the
Hague Service Convention).
160. Id.
161. 486 U.S. 694 (1988).
162. Schlunk, 468 U.S. at 70004 (noting that while the Convention does not
provide an express standard for “service abroad,” the drafting committee history
and Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention indicate that a “notification au parquet”
(service upon a foreign defendant by the deposit of documents with a designated
local official) were to be eliminated from the Convention).
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transnational discovery. 163
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING IN ARGENTINA VS. NML CAPITAL
In a 71 decision written by Justice Scalia 164 the Court held that
the FSIA did not preclude discovery of Argentina’s extraterritorial
assets.165 The Court noted that the general rule for federal discovery
is that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,”
notwithstanding the discretion of the district court.166 The Court
noted that Argentina had not raised this as an issue, so the Court
simply assumed that “in a run-of-the mill execution proceeding . . .
the district court would have been within its discretion to order the
discovery from third-party banks about the judgment debtor’s assets
located outside the United States.”167 The Court therefore found that
it faced only a narrow question: whether the FSIA provides for
immunity to discovery where the debtor is a sovereign. 168
The Court’s review of the post-judgment discovery motion
centered upon a strict textual interpretation of the FSIA. 169 The
majority found that under the FSIA, foreign states are provided two
kinds of immunity, “jurisdictional immunity,” and “execution
immunity.”170 The Court reasoned that jurisdictional immunity was
waived by Argentina and not at issue. 171 As far as execution
immunity was concerned, the Court noted that it generally shields
“‘property in the United States of a foreign state’ from attachment,
arrest, and execution.” 172 Focusing on the text of the statute itself, the
majority stated that there was no “plain statement” in the FSIA
providing a third type of immunity forbidding or limiting discovery
in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets.173
Argentina’s defense, according to the Court, was based on the
silence of the FSIA regarding discovery of a foreign-sovereign
163. Cocanougher, supra note 160, at 195.
164. Justice Sotomayor did not take part in either Argentina decision.
165. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252.
166. Id. at 2254 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)).
167. Id. at 2255 (citing EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 208
(2d Cir. 2012)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2256.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1609).
173. Id.
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judgment debtor’s assets. Argentina argued that before the enactment
of the FSIA, the United States routinely accorded absolute execution
immunity to foreign-state property. 174 Furthermore, Argentina argued
that by codifying executive immunity with only a small set of
exceptions, Congress merely “partially lowered the previously
unconditional barrier to post-judgment relief.”175
The Court
ultimately found this unpersuasive, stating that it was not its role to
solve the riddle of what Congress may have meant, but to interpret
“what Congress enacted in the FSIA.” 176
It is noteworthy that the majority decision did not consider
whether a judgment creditor had to show that assets were recoverable
in the jurisdiction before the court would permit discovery. 177 This,
however, was the chief argument of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.178 As
Justice Ginsburg noted, “no inquiry into a foreign sovereign’s
property in the United States that is not ‘used for a commercial
activity’ could be ordered; such an inquiry, as the Court recognizes,
would not be ‘relevant’ to execution in the first place.” 179 The dissent
further questioned what authority permitted a district court in the
United States to become a “clearinghouse for information” about
“any and all property held by Argentina abroad?” 180 Finally, the
dissent concluded that a limited discovery of Argentina’s “property
used [in the United States] or abroad ‘in connection with . . .
commercial activities,’” would be consistent with the FSIA and U.S
discovery law. 181
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Analyzed Immunity Grants Under the FSIA in a
Vacuum—Not Accounting for the Reality of Modern Financial
Transactions
The majority opinion stated that there are two types of
immunity: jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution. 182
174. Id. at 2257.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2258 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607,
618 (1992)).
177. Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).
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It also noted that Argentina was in a unique situation as it had waived
its jurisdictional immunity when it engaged in the bond deals with
foreign investors.183 The “uniqueness” of this position, however, is
debatable. Wall Street and most major global financial institutions are
based in New York and select New York law as the “choice of law”
for many agreements precisely for its pro-business laws and
regulations. 184 Firms have massive bargaining power and incentive to
induce nations to sign deals that waive the FSIA jurisdictional
immunity and/or consent to New York law before opening the flow
of capital. In light of the favorable decisions the holdouts have been
able to gain in the Southern District of New York and the Second
Circuit, sovereign jurisdictional waiver and New York choice of law
can hardly be considered unique.
The second type of immunity under the FSIA is immunity from
execution. The majority narrowly interpreted this type of immunity
to exclude discovery-in-aid of execution and to apply only to
sovereign property within the United States. 185 This interpretation,
however, inappropriately emphasizes geographical boundaries and
fails to consider the vital component of relevancy in discovery. While
the majority correctly noted that U.S. courts “generally lack
authority . . . to execute against property in other countries,” 186 the
suggestion that the FSIA permits discovery against non-attachable
extraterritorial sovereign property is out of step with the FSIA and
the FRCP.
The majority opinion thus carved out a greater exception to
immunity than Congress intended. Legislative history and prior U.S.
court decisions suggest that Congress only wanted to “partially lower
the barrier of immunity from execution,” not drastically reduce or
alter it.187 The FSIA codified the restrictive theory of immunity, a
183. Id.
184. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2009).
185. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252; 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2009).
186. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2257.
187. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604,
6604, 1976 WL 14078. See also Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Congo, 309 F.3d 240,
252 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that in H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, Congress only partially
lowered the barrier of immunity from execution, in order to make it conform more
closely with jurisdictional immunity; noting that immunity from execution is more
narrow); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting
that Congress passed the FSIA based on the “views of sovereignty expressed in the
1945 charter of the United Nations and the 1972 enactment of the European
Convention, which left the availability of execution totally up to the debtor state,”
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narrow restriction on the traditional absolute immunity accorded
sovereign states.188 If Congress wanted to create a greater restriction
on immunity, it would have done so.
B. The Majority’s Decision Overlooked the Relevancy
Requirement of U.S. Discovery
U.S. courts have interpreted the FSIA to mean that Congress
“create[d] rights without remedies, aware that plaintiffs would often
have to rely on foreign states to voluntarily comply with U.S. court
judgments.”189 The FSIA does not create an affirmative right for
judgment creditors to gain discovery about property without first
showing that there is a reasonable chance of execution against the
extraterritorial property.
The relevancy requirement in U.S. discovery rules is designed to
discourage “fishing expeditions.” Nonetheless, fishing for
information is precisely what NML Capital wishes to do and what the
majority opinion now permits. As the dissent correctly noted, “NML
does not yet know what property Argentina has [outside the United
States], let alone whether it is executable under the relevant
jurisdiction’s law.”190 But by permitting NML Capital to seek
information about Argentina’s “worldwide assets generally,” the
majority stated that the hedge fund will then be able to “turn up”
information about Argentina’s assets. 191 That information may or
may not yield assets subject to execution, the majority conceded, but
it noted that “Argentina’s self-serving legal assertion” – if a party
cannot execute a judgment against property, it should not pursue
discovery of information about that property – will not automatically
“prevail.”192 Ultimately, the majority found that the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York will “have to settle the
matter,” as a clearinghouse for information regarding Argentina’s
worldwide assets.193
Yet Argentina’s “self-serving legal assertion” is not so deviant
as the majority would portray. Essentially, Argentina argues that
discovery must be relevant in order to be valid. This is completely in
and only lifted the immunity from execution “in part”).
188. See supra Part II.A.
189. Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010).
190. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 2258 (majority opinion).
192. Id. at 225758.
193. Id.
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line with U.S. discovery rules under the FRCP.194 In fact, the
majority conceded that “information that could not possibly lead to
executable assets is simply not ‘relevant’” and would render
subpoenas seeking that type of information unenforceable. 195 But
because NML Capital’s subpoenas do not expressly state that they are
seeking information that “could not lead to executable assets in the
United States or abroad,” the majority found them permissible—
again emphasizing that NML Capital does not yet know where
Argentina’s property is located and should be given leave to search
the world to turn up information about Argentine assets. 196
Incredibly, the majority found that since neither party expressly
raised the issues of relevancy and the recoverability of extraterritorial
assets, it did not need to decide the issue. 197 Notwithstanding the fact
that relevancy is central to discovery, 198 the majority then by its own
logic, should have deferred to the Second Circuit, which recognized
in regard to extraterritorial assets that post-judgment discovery “must
be calculated to assist in collecting on a judgment.”199 The Second
Circuit further noted that the lower court was “well within [it’s]
discretion to limit discovery where the plaintiff had not demonstrated
any likelihood that the discovery it sought related to attachable
assets.”200 Though the discovery requests do not violate the FSIA,
they run counter to the long-standing requirements that for discovery
requests to be valid, they must be relevant.
C. The Majority Unduly Minimized the Significance of Foreign
Blocking Statutes and the Treatment of State-Owned Entities
In addition to narrowly interpreting immunity grants under the
FSIA, the majority in NML Capital ignored the possibility that those
compelled to produce discovery may face criminal penalties for their
non-compliance. Both sides of the pendulum are unworkable. Never
allowing discovery when a party faces criminal penalties would be a
doctrine susceptible to abuse and would undermine the authority of
U.S. courts. Conversely, compelling discovery regardless of criminal
penalties puts those subject to discovery requests in a “catch-22” of
194. See supra Part II.A.
195. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 225758.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
197. See id. at 2254 (stating that the Court “need not take up those issues
today”).
198. FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1).
199. EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 69(a)(2)).
200. Id.

010-RETH (DO NOT DELETE)

160

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/6/2015 10:39 AM

[Vol. 30

either facing criminal penalties in a foreign jurisdiction or contempt
of court sanctions in the United States. Lower courts require a clear
and consistent analysis that can equitably determine when to compel
production of discovery in these instances.
The Supreme Court, however, has clearly and consistently
denied lower courts such guidance. In Societe Internationale,201 the
Court failed to create a decision with precedential value by limiting
the analysis to the particular facts of the case. 202 In Aérospatiale,203
the Court undermined any harmonizing effects of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 204 and also failed to provide standards for
lower courts to use in balancing competing interests between the
United States and foreign nations. 205 NML Capital compounds this
problem, adding nothing but confusion and tension to U.S.
jurisprudence.
Moreover, NML Capital throws into question the separate
treatment of foreign state-owned entities and the state itself. While
separate corporate entities are founded on the doctrine of limited
liability, 206 lower courts are increasingly interpreting the actions of
central banks as those of a “private player,” opening assets to
attachment and execution and weakening the protections under the
FSIA. 207 This judicial trend, combined with NML Capital, means that
central banks or other state-owned entities could potentially be
deprived of sovereign immunity in transnational discovery postjudgment proceedings. As such, a plaintiff could access sensitive
information and data concerning a sovereign nation via litigation with
the central bank.
201. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
202. See supra Part II.B.2. See also Thomas Scott Murley, Compelling
Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and
Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 891 (1982)
(noting that the lack of precedential value may be responsible for the divergent
analyses used by lower courts regarding discovery and foreign blocking statutes).
203. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 522.
204. See supra Part II.B.4.
205. See supra Part II.B.2. (While suggesting that the Restatement (Third)
factors were the right factors to balance, the Supreme Court failed to create a
binding precedent from its decision.).
206. See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the
Modern Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2008) (discussing the separate
legal entity as promoting investment, entrepreneurship, and economic growth,
without liability attributed to the sovereign or parent company).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1996) (carving special protections for central bank
property). See Engellenner, supra note 82, at 394 (noting the trend in lower courts
in exposing central bank assets to attachment end execution).
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Ultimately, NML Capital continues the trend of U.S. courts
thrusting American discovery on the world. Perhaps this is a case of
misery loving company. But with many domestic litigants already
critical of numerous aspects of U.S. discovery, 208 the United States
should be hesitant to impose these rules on parties often unfamiliar
and ill-equipped to manage them in transnational disputes. In
addition to being overly broad, costly, and burdensome, U.S.
discovery in civil proceedings can expose parties to both criminal
penalties in their foreign jurisdictions and a heightened risk of
sensitive and irrelevant information disclosure. This is particularly
troubling for sovereign nations where a disclosure of information and
data could compromise privacy and security interests.
D. The Majority Opinion Disregards the Important Roles of
Comity and Reciprocity, Creating Uncertainty and Tension in
U.S. International Relations and Diplomacy
While the majority opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, was quick
to dismiss the international relations consequences of its decision in
NML Capital,209 the majority opinion in Aérospatiale, also joined by
Justice Scalia, noted that:
[W]e have long recognized the demands of comity in
suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as
sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation.
American courts should therefore take care to
demonstrate due respect for any special problem
confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its
nationality or the location of its operations, and for
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.210
While the majority in NML Capital is correct to point out that
the FSIA is the only factor in determining sovereign immunity, and
that the common law history is no longer authoritative, 211 the doctrine
of comity has not been erased and still has a place in modern
transnational disputes. Comity has traditionally been an important
element of U.S. jurisprudence, 212 and it can facilitate stronger
208. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84
MINN. L. REV. 505, 50506 (2000) (noting that American discovery remains “the
most debated, and in some cases the most fractious and vexing, aspect of litigation
today”).
209. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2258.
210. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
211. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2256.
212. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546; Brewer, supra note 94, at 53435.
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sovereignty as a flexible, diplomatic solution, rather than a rigid,
compulsory international framework.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has actually stated that deference
should be given to the doctrine of comity. In F. Hoffmann-La Roche
Ltd., v. Empagran S.A.,213 the Court noted that it “ordinarily construes
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the
sovereign authority of other nations,” a rule consistent with the
principles of customary international law. 214 In his dissenting opinion
in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,215 Justice Scalia advocated the
use of “prescriptive comity,” a doctrine where courts first assume that
Congress has taken comity into account when enacting the law, and
then interpret the law with this assumption in mind.216 Justice Scalia
further reasoned that “[c]omity in this sense includes . . . principles
that ‘in the absence of contrary congressional direction,’ are assumed
to be incorporated into our substantive laws having extraterritorial
reach.”217
In fact, the United States Government considers immunity from
execution under the FSIA as part of a “carefully constructed
framework [that] preserves comity” in balancing sovereign immunity
concerns.218 While a U.S. court may render a judgment against a
foreign state, the FSIA permits immunity from execution and
attachment of a foreign sovereign’s property, notwithstanding certain
statutory exceptions.219 This protection is important as “judicial
seizure of a foreign state’s property may be regarded as a serious
affront to the state’s sovereignty and affect [the U.S. Government’s]
relations with it.”220
While the Supreme Court is not the State Department, it should
not completely disregard the importance of comity and reciprocity as
it did in NML Capital. The United States noted in its amicus brief
213. 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
214. Id. at 164.
215. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
216. Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of prescriptive comity
to limit the use of U.S. antitrust law in foreign jurisdictions).
217. Id. (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 38283
(1959)).
218. Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supremecourt_preview/
briefs-v3/12-842_pet_amcu_usa.authcheckdam.pdf.
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012).
220. Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 9.
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supporting Argentina that, “‘some foreign states base their sovereign
immunity decisions on reciprocity.’” 221 The Court also recognized
the importance of reciprocity in Boos v. Barry,222 where it noted that
respecting the diplomatic immunity of foreign sovereigns will accord
the United States the same vital treatment.223 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also recognized the important role international reciprocity
plays in upholding judgments. In Hilton v. Guyot,224 the Court found
that while there was no prejudice, fraud, or lack of due process in the
French courts, U.S. judgments were not given conclusive effect there,
so the Court would not give conclusive effect to the French
judgment.225
NML Capital opens the door to adverse reciprocal treatment for
the United States abroad.226 Under reciprocal treatment, a foreign
court can set itself up as a “clearinghouse” for “information about
assets and transactions of the U.S. Government throughout the
world,”227 and need only cite NML Capital for justification. It is also
worth noting that private litigants, not another sovereign, initiated
NML Capital. Consequently, general and broad discovery about the
U.S. Government’s assets throughout the world could be compelled
at the instigation of a foreign private litigant.
The reality is that the rapid and consistent growth of the global
economy means that, more often than not, U.S. multinational
corporations will be involved or at least implicated in transactions
and litigation where foreign legal systems and discovery play an
important role.228 It would be best to have strong foreign relations
221. Id. at 20 (quoting Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 841
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984)).
222. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
223. Id. at 323–24.
224. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
225. Id. at 11921. Although it is an old case, Hilton is still the leading law and
deserves analysis. See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 150, 155 (2013) (noting that there is no federal law or treaty
governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States, and that therefore the Erie Doctrine prescribes that state law applies, even in
federal courts).
226. Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 20. See also National City
Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955) (noting that
“reciprocal self-interest” is a foundation for foreign sovereign immunity).
227. Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 21.
228. See Paul Robert Eckert, Utilizing the Doctrine of Adverse Inferences When
Foreign Illegality Prohibits Discovery: A Proposed Alternative, 37 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 749, 749 n.1 (1996) (acknowledging that “[w]ith the growth of a modern,
global economy, commercial business transactions routinely involve multinational
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and adaptable diplomacy embodied in the doctrines of comity and
reciprocity, rather than a hostile, forced export of U.S. discovery.
E. Sovereign Debt and Discovery Proceedings Are Not “Run-ofthe Mill”
The Court noted, without deciding, that discovery from nonparty
banks about the judgment debtor would be permitted in “run-of-themill” execution proceedings.229 The implication is that since
Argentina did not raise the fact that it is “Argentina,” the Court did
not have to consider its sovereign status. Sovereign debtors are not
typical debtors for the obvious reasons that they are countries, and
while they have consented to engage in international commerce and
to accept foreign direct investment, the ramifications of default and
intrusive discovery must be considered.230
Sovereign insolvency is nothing new,231 and is certainly not a
historical anomaly. 232 As the Argentine default teaches, the modern
world and global economy only increase the potential for gain and
loss.233 Incidents of international financial crisis have increased since
the 1990s, particularly among emerging-market countries. 234
Sovereign debt is not just a problem for debtor and creditor—it
is a global issue with far reaching implications. As the ever-growing
global market continues to embrace sovereign bonds, so grows the
risk that one country’s default could “trigger systemic collapse.” 235
While there is a dogmatic belief (mostly espoused by creditors) that
corporations with offices located in and subject to the laws of, a foreign
jurisdiction.”).
229. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2255.
230. See Nate Raymond, Argentina Faces Skeptical U.S. Court Over Creditors’
Subpoenas, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014, 6:25 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/201
4/12/17/argentina-debt-appeal-idUSL1N0U136020141217 (noting that the Second
Circuit acknowledged that Argentina is not an ordinary litigant).
231. See de Jonge, supra note 10, at 129 (noting that Philip II of Spain declared
a moratorium on the repayment of debts several times during the 1500s).
232. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT
DEV. AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 1 (Apr.
26, 2013) available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf
(noting the sovereign debt restructurings of Greece in February 2012, Belize in
2007 and 2013, Jamaica in 2010 and 2013, and St. Kitts and Nevis in 2012).
233. See Fernando M. Martin & Christopher J. Waller, Sovereign Debt: A
Modern Greek Tragedy, 94 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 321, 321
(noting the recent financial crises of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain).
234. Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, The Resolution of International Financial
Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds, BANK OF CAN. REV., Winter
20012002, at 4.
235. See de Jonge, supra note 10, at 146.
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sovereign debt obligations and restructuring should focus on the
reality of private law (i.e., “a contract is a contract”), this view fails
to encompass the whole picture because it ignores the distinct
features that separate sovereign defaults from those in the private
sector and the important public international law issues at stake.236
Unlike a private financial crisis, there are no bankruptcy
proceedings in sovereign defaults, creating a number of unique
distinctions for debtor-countries. Creditors have little motivation to
negotiate timely and moderate deals because there is no threat of
bankruptcy to contend with. 237 Additionally, under the terms of many
outstanding bonds, minority holdout creditors cannot be forced to
join a settlement that has been accepted by the majority of creditors,
something that would occur in bankruptcy proceedings. 238 Also,
sovereign debtors cannot invoke protection against “hostile creditors”
and are therefore subject to creditor lawsuits. 239
Creditor consensus is another distinguishing feature that creates
unique problems during sovereign debt restructurings. If a sovereign
nation wishes to continue participating in the global financial
markets, it cannot restructure its debt without the consent and
participation of its creditors.240 But it is precisely this need for
consensus that can allow creditors to hold out during debt
restructuring, as they did in NML Capital.
The holdout problem has been compounded as sovereign debt
financing has shifted toward bondholder investing rather than
traditional bank lending.241 Unlike banks, foreign bondholders and
speculators have less incentive to build commercial relationships with
a country. 242 Moreover, bondholder investments tend to be smaller
236. MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 21 (2011).
237. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and
Borrowing, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion
Paper No. 198, 6 (Apr. 2010).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Steven L. Schwarcz,”Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53
EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004) [hereinafter “Idiot’s Guide”].
241. Id. at 1193.
242. Id. See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1004 n.283
(2000) [hereinafter Restructuring] (utilizing the example of the 1999 Russian debt
arrears to demonstrate that investors are motivated to accelerate debt, whereas,
bank lenders “'want future business with Russia’ and therefore ‘may be unwilling
to pressure the Government on the [debt] arrears’”).
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than traditional bank loans, leading to a greater number of
bondholders to negotiate with and increasing the risks of a holdout.243
As NML Capital teaches, holdout problems create unique litigation
and repayment issues that are not present in private sector financial
crises.
A common remedy offered to combat the holdout problem is the
inclusion of collective action clauses (CAC) in a bond deal
agreement. CACs are private-law solutions that permit changes to
the agreement’s payment terms through a vote of the creditors. 244 But
CACs are not a straightforward answer. First, voting thresholds are
not standardized and can vary significantly—from 19 to 75 percent.245
Second, there may be procedural requirements attached to CACs (i.e.,
a requirement of a bondholder meeting before a vote) that raise costs
and may create barriers to negotiations.246 Importantly, CACs do not
bind creditors across bond agreements meaning creditors may be
incentivized to vote against restructuring their own agreements in
case another set of creditors holds out,247 creating a “Prisoners’
Dilemma” situation.248 With a large number of creditors, a CAC can
be rendered impotent.
There is also concern that broad discovery against a sovereign
can create risks to national security and undermine the authority of a
nation as a sovereign. Holdout creditors are not just seeking
information regarding Argentine assets, but also information
regarding Argentine military equipment and diplomatic property. 249 It
does not take much imagination or understanding of foreign
sovereign immunity or post-judgment execution discovery to realize
that this is potentially quite problematic.

243. Idiot’s Guide, supra note 241, at 1193.
244. Buchheit, supra note 238, at 16 (discussing that CACs were introduced to
bonds governed by New York law in 2003, having already been a standard feature
of bonds governed by UK law).
245. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign
Bonds, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 131, 142 (2012).
246. Id.
247. Id. (explaining that creditors from one bond deal will want to ensure they
receive as close to repayment on their bonds as possible; if they submit to
restructuring at a fraction of the price, then creditors from a separate bond deal
could hold out and receive more money).
248. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination,
Game Theory, and the Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 21516 (2009) (explaining the
classic game theory that in the absence of mutually assured cooperation, two
entities are incentivized to not cooperate).
249. Raymond, supra note 231.
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CONCLUSION

In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., the Supreme
Court permitted post-judgment discovery in-aid-of execution upon a
sovereign’s extraterritorial assets, though no showing had been made
that the information sought was reasonably calculated to lead to
attachable property. 250 The Court found that since the subpoenas
were neither targeted at Argentina nor Argentine property, but rather,
targeted at non-party banking institutions concerning general
information about Argentina’s world-wide assets, permitting
discovery did not violate the FSIA. 251 But by refusing to consider the
relevancy of the discovery requested – as required by the FRCP – the
Court rendered a ruling that violates a fundamental tenet of U.S.
discovery law.252 Furthermore, the Court’s disregard of the doctrines
of comity and reciprocity will jeopardize the U.S. Government’s
international relations, creating uncertainty and contention. 253
Importantly, the Court’s treatment of the Argentina sovereign debt
crisis as a “run-of-the-mill” proceeding oversimplifies a complex and
controversial issue. 254
As it stands, NML Capital contributes to an already problematic
jurisprudence that fails to provide lower courts a consistent analytical
model to balance U.S. interests against foreign blocking statutes
when determining whether to compel transnational discovery. 255 But
NML Capital has gone one step further. By compelling discovery
about a sovereign’s extraterritorial assets even though they may be
immune from execution, the Court has opened an uncertain door that
neither the FSIA nor Congress intended. 256

250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 225657.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
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